

**BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES IN 50 YEARS OF SINO-NIGERIA
RELATIONS**

BY

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Introduction

Relations amongst actors in the globe assume many forms owing to the interest of the actors. These relationships are established between state-state actors, state-non-state actors and between non-state actors alike. The establishment of diplomatic relations is pursuant to the attainment of foreign policy goals of states. On attainment of independence, many states move to gain recognition and by establishing ties that seek to achieve objectives that should drive their developmental goals and as such the relations between the Nigeria state and China is the initiative of China rather than Nigeria.

Both Nigeria and China in their relations with each other have created official diplomatic interactions in February 1971, which was the same year the then Communist People's Republic of China secured the seat of the United Nations Security Council; which simultaneously coincides with the expulsion from the United Nations of the nationalist government in Taiwan, which previously occupied the seat (Alden, 2005). China's permanent presence in the Security Council meant that from 1971, it started to enjoy the use of veto and participates effectively in the deliberations of the UN Agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the specialized fields, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). China's foreign policy have centered in promoting relations with several countries, that is, it asserts its sovereignty over Taiwan and condemns any country that accepts diplomatic ties with the later. More so, the relationship between Nigeria from the onset has a political coloration which was not glorious as rightly expressed by Albert (2019):

Sino-Nigerian relations began and maintained tepidness from 1971 and for a long time after that, the Nigerian and Chinese governments found themselves on the opposite sides of the

political tussles between the global powers. For example, at the beginning of the relationship, while Russia supported the Nigerian government's war efforts against Biafra, China leaned towards supporting anti-colonial struggles in opposition of Russia and .including the United States there by signing to the Non-Aligned Movement.

Over the years, relationships bordering on economic dealings have paved the way for other forms of interconnectedness to development such as technological, military/security and critical infrastructural ties which has accrued benefits to both states.

However, China and Nigeria are members of G77-group of developing countries within the United Nations which help to promote the South–South Trade and Cooperation. The drastic effect is that the increase of the trade size from just about 300 percent since 2004 hold down to it at \$7.7 billion in 2010, placing Nigeria as the second major China trade partner in the continent of Africa. Nigeria enjoys bi-lateral flow of foreign direct investment from China particularly in oil and mineral resources, making the China – Nigeria relation to be beneficial to themselves, ((Egbula and Zheng, 2011). Consequent upon that, this paper seeks to unearth the nature of Nigeria-China Relations and the forms it has taken to benefit the state of Nigeria. By and large, the paper will be covering the benefits Nigeria has recorded in the five decades of diplomatic relations with China mainly in its contribution to development and national growth between them. The motive is to point out the gains in different sector of the national life of Nigeria against arguments that shades this long friendship as a parasitic one as opposed to a symbiotic one.

Literature Review

Different factors have characterized the Sino-Nigeria relationship, with the migration programs, the aid factor, the Chinese investment and loans made China's relationship with

Nigeria distinctive. Sautman and Hairong (2007) claim that China's perspectives to economic matters with Nigeria are in conjunction with Washington neo-liberal approach of good governance, democracy and decreased poverty. Brautigam, (2003) avers that almost all loans generated by China are at near 0% interest, long term facilities. According to Taylor, (2006) this may be accounted for the Chinese investment progressing above US\$100 billion noted for years ago. Taylor's argument has made other scholars to research into Nigeria-China Trade Relations and its effects on Nigeria socio-economic development (Muritala et'al 2019). For example, according to Alden (2005), majority of the Chinese sponsored projects in Nigeria and Africa has been griped to be using Chinese labor instead of Nigerians and African workers. This can be seen in the famous article by the Economist (2018) which gave an overview of the data of 264,000 Chinese workers that are present in Africa. The figures excluded informal migrants that are estimated to be more than a million (Economist, 2018). The above is "*evident in Nigeria textiles industries where the produce from China has led to the closure of local factories*" (De Lorenzo, 2007).

According to Utomi (2007), trade relations between Nigeria and China have increased in the last five decade from limited contact to a growing complex business engagement. However, Nigeria is experiencing trade deficit with China due to higher imports of Chinese goods in relative to exports from Nigeria to China. The present reality is suggesting that this trade deficit may grow except if Nigeria can increase its home-grown options with better quality and competitive prices. From a data gotten from UNCTAD (2018), the locomotion of goods and services from Africa to China have always been in removable resources between 2012 and 2017. Singularly, fuels and Oil constituted 62% and 60% of the total exports to China between 2002 and 2013 (Pigato and Tang, 2015). Other products are natural and unrefined, accounting for more than 96% of exports to China. This is against over 94.6 % imports from China which were in manufactured goods, amounting to trade deficit of almost \$19.5 billion annually from 2012 to 2017 (UNCTAD, 2018).

However, Anshan (2007) made an argument that China's relations with Nigeria have brought serious unemployment impacts on Nigeria as a whole. According to Alden (2005), the main focus of Chinese relationship with Nigeria is to access the untapped raw materials domiciled in Africa and Nigeria specifically. This, according to Alden (2005) was observed in China's predominant focus on energy, new market and investment opportunity, under the umbrella of cooperation and mutual support on major issues (Konings, 2007). Zweig and Jianhai (2005) opine that China - Nigeria policy is driven by robust China development strategy which brought out need for access to energy resources and export opportunities for its manufacturing, agro-processing, textile, and communications potentials.

The observation from the position of many scholars above is the temptation to treat post-Cold War African international politics in the light of Cold War rivalry. While it is true that international politics after the Cold War retains some attributes of rival confrontation for resources, there have been many transformations that have reduced the extent of this attribute. Its character has evolved new dynamics which have altered the course of international relations. For example, the traditional posture which features the states as lone actors in African affairs has since been transformed. In the 21st Africa, states may be the dominant actors but their actions and inactions are influenced by emerging non-state parties. The traditional conception of the status of state actors is no longer obtainable. Thus, the various actors and their interest need cogent re-evaluation for a clearer understanding of the nature of engagements between the states, non-state actors and the various international partners. Though events in the Middle east, particularly in Syria seems to resemble the kind of confrontation that was witnessed during the Cold War, they are not entirely same as the case of Cold War confrontation.

The Most of the gap in the literatures above are the overt generalization based on the perception which depicts Africa as a single state. In other words, most of the writers treated Africa as a single state in which all its various component states react to and are treated as

indivisible unit. This perception undermines the reality of Africa that has different independent states with specific foreign policy objectives. Even the various international actors have specific foreign policy objectives for different states depending on the level of interest. Interest is generated from the specific kind of resources available that the international actors may search for. This is to say that US, France, and Britain's interest, for instance may differ depending on their defined national interest. This is even truer of China's interest in Africa. It is structured for specific states depending on its resources thus it will be unlikely for the generalizations to fit into the specific interest area of the actors under consideration.

Again, most of the available literatures relied on secondary data and qualitative conclusions which lack empirical sophistication. This is particularly true of most of the pessimistic views about the inevitability of conflicts as advanced by aggressive realist, John Mearsheimer. This study intends to developed a more coherent data-based argument that seeks to determine the nature of the relationship between Nigeria as a regional power and China as a world power. This will help to guide other debates around the theme and create the new for a more scientific argument devoid of generalization. It is expected to be a major contribution to the body of existing literatures on the theme under consideration.

Theoretical Framework

In this study, the theoretical framework that will be use is the interdependence theory. The interdependence theory was adopted because it best captures the essence of this project work, and would provide valuable insights into nature of economic relations between Nigeria and China leading to development in critical sectors of the Nigerian society. Interdependence theory believe that states are not the only actors in international system and that non-actors such as non-governmental organizations, individuals, etc. are also play a role in the international system. Joseph Nye gave an interesting theory of modern international relations through his concept of complex interdependence. Nye represents

interdependence in an analytical sense, as "situations in which actors or events in different parts of a system affect each other" (Nye, 1979). Nye continues his definition of interdependence by repeating that the results are often varied and although the potential for benefits exist, the potential for misadventure exists as well. Despite this potential for varying results Nye also notes that it is very arduous and very costly for a country to try and cut itself off from the world, such as Myanmar or Albania did.

According to Nye relationship can be divided into four separate dimensions, which are its sources, benefits, costs, and symmetry. These important can come up in both the physical and social aspects of society. The idea of economic relationship is concept that cannot be disputed as a reality in this modern world. According to Nye, "economic interdependence involves principle choices about values and costs." These policy choices are based most often on the concept of supply and demand; in the sense that what one country cannot produce for its citizens, can be supplied through trade with other country. These verdict decisions however, are quite often not as simple as just supply and demand, but instead are largely vulnerable upon the distribution of resources, especially those resources considered to be "power resources". In Nye's explanation of complex interdependence, he is very quick to point out that in and of itself, interdependence is neither a good thing nor a bad thing.

He also posited that as with any decision or any theory, there are certain benefits and certain costs associated with it; economic interdependence is no different in this respect. However, the benefits created by complex interdependence, with economic interdependence as a main aspect has proven more often than not to be beneficial for all parties involved. In this globalized world today, technology is increasing in a way that the distance between countries is gradually getting smaller overtime, not only in the aspect of travel for people, but also of information. It holds that there is no hierarchy of issues in the international system meaning all issues with international outlook are important, particularly those that borders on world peace, development and that the use of force is not recognized way of defining interstate relations. The theory dismisses war as an instrument of state policy

utilized to achieve state objectives. The theory of interdependence basically emphasizes relationship of mutuality, and inter-dependence among nation-states rather than isolationism.

Historical Background of Sino-Nigeria Relations

Escaping from World War II (WWII), China's foreign policy has frequently been driven by two well-articulated principles: an anti-imperialist agenda that inevitably was as a result of its dependent subjugations in the 19th century; the second is China's unrepentant claims over Taiwan. China's anti colonial stance justifies its South–South solidarity, a foreign policy objective that has its roots in Chairman Mao Zedong's "Three World" policy: (a) the defense of state sovereignty (b) non-interference in internal affairs and (c) a pluralist/anti universalist/Asian Values" impression of human rights (theory, 1974).

The struggle over Taiwan is based on China's erstwhile leader Chiang Kai-shek initial conviction for the unification of war-torn China in the 1920s and his determination to fight the invading Japanese in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) (Albert, 2019). After the end of WW11, Chiang fought his Communists compatriots but was exiled to Taiwan, where he remained the leader of the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government until his death in 1975. Before Chiang's death, both Beijing and Taipei struggled for state recognition.

These two countries foreign policy objectives are no doubt managed by the domestic interest of China. Before the onset of the Nigerian-Biafran war, "Lagos made no attempt to form a working relationship with the Chinese" (Ogunbadejo and Oye, 1976), in effect, there was no substantial diplomatic relations between Nigeria and China as at 1966. As the Nigerian civil war raged on, China flirted with the Biafran secessionists possibly to counter the Western and Soviet involvement. Moscow's intervention on the side of Nigeria influenced the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chen Yi to denounce what he termed the "Soviet revisionism, in league with US and British imperialism" in "massacring the Biafran people

in a vain attempt to squeeze into Nigeria and enjoy an equal share with imperialism there" (Porter, 1984).

The public act must have paid off positively to the extremist since there were unconfirmed allegations that China transferred a limited number of small arms to them through Tanzania (Porter, 1984). As the Sino-Soviet competition abated and China's support to the African liberation movement increased, many African governments supported the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution concede the Peoples Republic of China to the world body in October 1971. 1971 is important to the China and Nigeria relations. At the 26th session of the UNGA, Nigeria surprised the West when she acknowledged the addition of mainland China in the UN as well as to the exclusion of Taiwan. China is thankful of this African solidarity as Jin Yongjian, a Chinese Ambassador agreed that the 1971 UN episode remains indelible to the Chinese people:

The Chinese people will never forget that in 1971 it was African countries that helped restore the legitimate seat of the People's Republic of China in the UN. Over the years, without the firm support from African countries, China could not have defeated anti-China draft resolutions tabled by some Western countries at the United Nations...and moves made by a handful of countries on Taiwan's so called participation in the UN and WHO ...The Chinese Government always attaches great importance to Africa...As China is the largest developing country in the world and Africa has more developing nations than any other continent, China-Africa co-operation constitutes an important part and parcel of the South-South co-operation (Yongjian, 2005).

The Creation of formal consular ties between the two countries in 1971 was followed by the first visit to China by a Nigerian Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon in 1972, shortly after the Nigeria's civil war. Other Nigerian presidents also visited China without the Asian power exchange the gesture for over twenty-five years. Nonetheless, in President Obasanjo's second tenure (2003-2007), a deeper Nigeria-China relation begin. After series of visits by Obasanjo to China, China's President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao set down those visits to Nigeria (Egbula and Zheng, 2011).

Gains Recorded in Five Decades of Sino-Nigeria Relations on the Part of the Nigerian State

In the five-decade long relations Nigeria has had with the state of China, it is meant to examine the absorption that has result the Nigerian state from these correspondences. The Nigeria-China relations has come under an avenue of mutual benefit and win-win cooperation. This section shall discuss benefits that have been achieved in critical sectors of the Nigeria society. Sectors with pronounced Chinese involvement and benefits include: transportation (railways), Military/security, communication and power.

Rail Transportation

Nigeria's government has been involved in a number of foreign actors in this effort, including the African Development Bank with German-Nigerian company Julius Berger for the central trunk line and a new concession with General Electric for the existing narrow-gauge network. The largest projects in this sector, however, have been influence by Chinese firms. China Civil Engineering Construction Company (CCECC), a subsidiary of China Railway Construction Company, is involved in multiple roots projects across the country, including the Lagos airport expansion, numerous road projects, and inner-city light rail projects in Abuja and Lagos, all financed with concessional loans from the Exim Bank of China (Agbebi & Virtanen, 2017).

In the railway district, Chinese finance is backing two major standard-gauge rail (SGR) projects. Firstly, is the upgrading of the Western trunk line from Lagos to Kano, which replaced the colonial track. CCECC was first contracted in 2006 to construct the route, which gave the Nigerian authorities difficulties in raising its part of the funding, the project was later suspended; the line was subsequently segmented to be built in installments (Jonas, 2015). Of the planned route, the 187-kilometer (116-mile) from Abuja-Kaduna single-track SGR was the first to be completed in 2014, at a cost of \$874 million. CCECC is in the process of building the next 312-kilometer (194-mile) Lagos-Ibadan segment, which was awarded in 2014 after the completion of the Abuja-Kaduna line, at a cost of \$1.2 billion; financing for the \$1.1 billion Kano-Kaduna segment is still under discussion (UNCTAD, 2018). Unlike the light rail and other infrastructure projects, which are financed under concessional terms, the interest rate and loan terms for these SGR projects are undisclosed.

The second main project is a newly constructed coastal railway connecting from Lagos to Calabar, through Warri and Port Harcourt, to include branch lines to Benin City and Onitsha. This was not among the original twenty-five-year vision but planned by CCECC as part of three east-west routes that would cut across the colonial trunk lines. Of these three, only the southern coastal route had prospect for finance and political interest. The contract for the project, signed with CCECC in 2016, is reported to be worth \$11 billion (Aljazeera, 2019). The Nigerian senate approved a loan request to the Exim Bank of China in April 2017, which includes \$3.5 billion for the coastal project, indicating that the route will be segmented like the Lagos-Kano line, with the eastern segment from Port Harcourt to Calabar to be constructed first (Albert, 2019).

Military/Security gains

The security threats surrounding Nigeria are inherently voluminous. In spite of its large Army, to major rebellions prevail (Niger Delta and Boko-haram). Chinese analysts are well aware of Boko Haram, which began in 2002 in the northeastern state of Borno but has

staged attacks throughout Nigeria, including the capital, Abuja (Li , 2013).Ethnic and local issues in the Niger Delta have cropped up since the 1990s. The area is the center of Nigeria's oil production, where the environmental effect of drilling is most acute, but the revenues of oil exports are seldom reinvested in the region. Armed groups began in 2004, and kidnappings and seizures of foreign oil corporations' employees and facilities began around 2006, along with piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. A presidential amnesty beginning in 2009 for rebels who turned themselves and their arms in brought the level of violence down for a while, but by 2016, a wide variety of groups had reemerged, launching fresh attacks on oil facilities (Agbebi and Virtanen, 2017).

However, Nigeria has not been able to get modern arms that will be used to fight these threats, in which China has supplied some of them. In 2010, China sold 15 F-7NI fighter aircraft and trainers, along with Surface-to-air missiles, to Nigeria, a deal approximate to have been worth USD 251 million (SIPR, 2017). Five CH3 unmanned combat aerial vehicles were sold to Nigeria by Beijing. Approximately about USD271million worth of sales represent almost a quarter of the foreign arms purchase of Nigeria, the largest of any single country, although sales from the United States, Italy, and Russia are also notable (Albert, 2019). Russia has supplied the Nigerian government with combat helicopters for its counterinsurgency operations. China also donated two P-18 1,800-ton patrol corvettes (PLAN Type 056; NATO designation) to the Nigerian Navy: the NNS Centenary (F91) and NNS Unity (F92). With the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, the need for such ships has become necessary. Buhari's September 2018 visit to China led to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) in June 2019 for Beijing to supply another USD 8.1 million in support for Nigeria's counterterrorism efforts (Omonobi, 2019).

China's concerns for Nigeria's security are increasing. In 2007 during President Buhari's September 2018 visit to China and the FOCAC meeting, discussions were being held with President Xi, leading to an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in June 2019. 2007 saw the abduction of Chinese workers in the Niger Delta region and the captain of the

Chinese owned ship was murdered like the Chinese instruction workers in Borno state, the center of the Boko Haram insurgency (Jonas and Mathieu, 2015). Four Chinese were kidnapped for ransom in 2018, and four killed in 2012–16 (Albert, 2019). China is also active in the broader region, contributing peacekeeping troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (Nations, 2019).

Communication Technology Gains

Chinese telecommunications companies have moved assiduously into the Nigerian market, as they have elsewhere in Africa, but have not attempted to run their own networks. The Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company (ZTE) has been in the country since 2001, and claims that its core businesses in Nigeria are manufacturing handsets and supplying system equipment ((SIPR), 2017). The company has estimated that it has sold 40 million handsets in Nigeria, but says that most do not carry ZTE's logo, but rather the logo of the network service provider. ZTE also supplies system equipment to two local network providers, Starcom and Multilinks (France24, 2009).

Huawei, another Chinese telecommunications company, is also active in Nigeria, and has expanded its presence there far more aggressively than has ZTE. Huawei has six offices in the country than ZTE's, and they help in supplying system equipment to all its network service providers in Nigeria, including market leader MTN, and Zain. Glo and Zoom. Huawei has a training Centre in Abuja with over 4000 'graduates' and it claims a growing corporate social responsibility program (Aljazeera, 2019). On the company's own estimate, it was the 'number 1' supplier in the domestic telecoms market in 2017 (Aljazeera, 2019).

Huawei and ZTE are highly competing with themselves in Nigeria. According to one Chinese Embassy source, the two companies "compete very hard for the same bids, which are very useful to the end client as it reduces the cost of the project" (CTV, 2019). 2006 saw the cooperation of Huawei and ZTE in Nigeria on a 300million dollar National Rural

Telephone Program. This federal government project involves connecting hundreds of rural communities to a telephone network, with the first \$200 million of the funding provided by a concessionary mortgage from China (Studies, 2016). Phase I of the project finished in 2008, but an anticipated second phase has been put on hold and it is unclear whether it will go ahead (CTV, 2019).

Another aspect of Nigeria–China partnership in communications is the NIGCOMSAT-1R satellite. The China great wall cooperation built and launched the satellite in May 2007 but vanished into thin air in November 2008 due to power equipment failure. The satellite, which had never functioned properly, cost \$251 million, of which \$51 million was provided by the federal government and the balance by a federally guaranteed loan from China. China Great Wall Corporation has reportedly promised to build and launch another satellite at no extra cost by 2011 which was finally done in 2019 (Online, 2019).

Gains in the Power Sector

Nigeria's power generation was a national disaster until the involvement of Chinese firms. The country has installed electricity generation capacity of 6 000 megawatts (MW), with a functioning capacity of 4500 MW, but averages actual output of only 1 500–3 000 MW. Often it is much lower (PHCN, 2019). Egypt, with 60% of Nigeria's population, generates 18 000 MW, six times more than Nigeria, and South Africa, with a population a third of Nigeria's, generates 45 000 MW, 15 times more. The UK generates 76 000 MW and the US, with a population of 250 million, 80% higher than Nigeria's, generates 813 000 MW, 271 times more than in Nigeria (Okafor, 2018). Nigeria is truly a tiny global power generation state. Because electricity generation from the national grid is so low, millions of Nigerian businesses and individuals depend on diesel generators for power, and every urban area throb to the sound of them, reeking of diesel as a consequence. The cost, waste and pollution of this process are immense and to rectify this, the government of Nigeria set itself the target of boosting national generation capacity to 20 000 MW (Albert, 2019).

Under the watch of the National Integrated Power Project (NIPP), the government exhausted billions of Dollars. In early 2009 the government restarted NIPP, despite withering criticism of the project by the Power Committee of the House of Representatives ((Nigeria), 2019). The government's target is to raise capacity to 6 000 MW by the end of 2009, which it says can mainly be achieved through improved maintenance (STV, 2019). Nigeria secured agreement with the Chinese government to build a massive 2600 MW hydro-electric power station at Mambilla, in Taraba State, during the 2006 China–Africa summit and linked the project to the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) acquiring oil blocs in the 2007 bidding round (Wong, 2009). Money was allocated in the national designate for Mambilla in 2008, but never disbursed, and an allocation was also made in the 2009 budget and thus the project commenced (FGN, 2009). Nigerian government promised a delegation of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade in March 2009 that the government was soon going to look at Mambilla 'critically and see what could be done', but offer nothing specific (Xinhua, 2009).

In inclusion to Mambilla, Su Zhong and Sino hydro of China build a 950 MW hydro-electric power station in Zungeru, in Niger State, capitalized by the Exim Bank. Other new power projects in which Chinese companies have a significant stake include: the 335 MW Olorunsogo (also known as Papalanto) gas-turbine power stations in Ogun State, where the Electric Power Construction Corporation began construction in late 2005. Olorunsogo has been costed at \$220.7 million, 35% of which is coming from the Nigerian government and the balance from a credit facility provided by Exim Bank (PHCN, 2019). Another is the 335 MW Omotosho gas-turbine power station in Ondo State, completed by the China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation in 2007, and again largely financed by the Exim Bank. Also financed by the Exim Bank, although in fact built by Germany's Siemens, is the 138 MW Geregu gas-turbine power station in Kogi State (Foster, 2018). Finally, in February 2008, it was announced that the China National Electric and Equipment Corporation would construct and run for a time a 115 MW coal-powered

plant at Enugu, in Enugu State. Chinese firms have also been largely involved in the building of Transmission stations scattered about in Nigeria which has improved power transmission from 1500MWz to 5000MWz (Albert, 2019).

Cultural Relations

Culture is a major aspect of sustainable development. Nigeria and China have engaged themselves in a cultural relationship that is promoting their cultures and languages in both countries. According to Sherrif & Nasiru (2016) different activities have been put in place in several aspects of cultural integration and exchange between both countries can be seen in songs, dance, festival celebrations, craft exhibitions and exchange of traditional attires as seen in their first edition of CHINGERIA fashion show in 2016. China has established Confucius Institute in Awka University with the aim of teaching language and culture to university students. China has also contributed in promoting research and giving scholarships exchange between Nigeria and China. Nigeria is yet to build similar centers for learning Nigeria languages in China; Nigeria should establish centers for teaching Nigerian Languages where teachers could be recruited to teach these Nigerian languages to the Chinese in China in order to uplift their foreign earnings.

Challenges in Sino-Nigeria Relations

According to (Akongbowa, 2008), Infrastructural decay remained one of the challenges faced in Nigeria and if nothing is done to arrest the situation, it will further escalate. If Nigeria doesn't make effort to tackle this menace, foreign investments will continue to escape us. Poor technology has restricted the full participation of Nigeria in the global economy and as a result, China has become a key partner for technology transfer despite concerns and reservations by the citizens. It is also captured in (SIPR, 2017) that the technology transfer by Chinese firms is of less value because they import already complete equipment as well as their workers. Zamfara state government signed a multi-million-dollar project with China to build some factories. However, In the joint venture, Chinese

companies take a major percentage in all the project areas leaving Zamfara with less. It is expected that China will come up with the project design, selection of befitting technology, purchase of all the needed equipment, fix and run them while Zamfara state Government will make available land, mining license, security, and recruitment of miners. Although China has complained about the sudden upsurge of insecurity arising from social violence, foreign investors are being kidnapped while their properties and investments are also being attacked; a clear example is oil bunkering and vandalization of public installations.

Conclusion and Recommendations

There is no doubt that Nigeria and China bilateral relationship has been of immense benefit to both states. Drawing from the analysis of this diplomatic relation, the benefits that the Nigeria state has recorded are centered around military/security, rail transportation, communication technology and the power sector of the Nigerian economy. Loans and debt agreements entered into by the both states have been used to finance developments in these sectors. It is obvious that the Nigeria state has benefited from the arms sales of the Chinese state in its campaigns against non-state actors that are staging armed rebellion against the state. This came at a time when Western powers chose not to offer military aid to Nigeria. The Chinese state has been largely involved in the construction of railway lines that crisscrosses the nation. This has eased the transportation of both humans and cargos. Nigeria has also recorded gains in its telecommunication sector, all thanks to her relationship with China. Globally recognized firms such as Huawei, ZTE have helped strengthen the telecom infrastructures in Nigeria. Lastly, the power sector has seen the construction of more power plants such as the Omotosho, Zungeru, Geregu and Mambila gas power plants which have boosted power generation in Nigeria from 1500MWz to 5000MGz. Although some of these projects are yet to be completed, it is important to point out that Nigeria is no longer where she used to be prior to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with China in 1971.

Nigeria-China relations have been thriving since the diplomatic treatise signed in seventies. The China bilateral agreement with Nigeria can never be reverse just like that. Nigeria must therefore identify its technological gaps with a view to benefitting from China in its bid to make Nigeria relevant along this direction.

Fundamentally, the Nigerian leadership must demonstrate the political will to manage Nigeria's pluralism for peace, security and sustainable economic transformation. It is equally important for the state of Nigeria to define her foreign policy with the state of China since they are now major partners in the global south dichotomy. The Nigerian state should also diversify her diplomatic attention to other states in the globe, this way over dependence on China will be avoided. The conditionalities surrounding the offer of aids and loans should be reviewed to address the concerns of critics that Nigeria will run into modern day slavery. Nigeria is yet to build similar centers for learning Nigeria languages in China, Nigeria should establish centers for teaching Nigerian Languages, that is teachers could be recruited to teach these Nigeria languages to the Chinese in China in order to uplift their foreign earnings.

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