

Geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence and the Changing Nature of Global Power

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Abstract

The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming economic, technological and strategic relations among states and creating new dimensions of global power. This study examined the geopolitics of AI and the changing nature of global power, focusing on competition among major powers, unequal access to AI capabilities, and the implications for developing countries. The study adopted a qualitative research design based on documentary analysis of books, peer-reviewed journal articles, reports of international organisations, policy documents and other relevant secondary sources. The analysis was guided by Power Transition Theory, which provides a framework for understanding how changes in the relative capabilities of states influence the distribution of power in the international system. The study found that AI has become an important component of national power, with the United States and China occupying central positions in global AI competition through investment, research, computing capacity, skilled personnel and technological infrastructure. It also found that AI infrastructure, expertise and research capabilities remain highly concentrated, leaving many developing countries dependent on technologies and knowledge produced elsewhere. Furthermore, unequal technological capabilities extend into AI governance, where countries and private technology companies with greater resources have stronger opportunities to influence emerging standards and rules. The study concludes that AI is not replacing traditional sources of power but is adding a significant technological dimension to them. It recommends stronger investment in AI research and innovation, digital infrastructure and human capital, alongside greater participation of developing countries in global AI governance.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Geopolitics, Global Power, Power Transition Theory, AI Governance, Developing Countries, Technological Competition.

Introduction

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has moved beyond the world of computers and laboratories to become an important part of contemporary international politics. It is now being used in areas such as defence, intelligence, cybersecurity, economic production, healthcare, communication and public administration. This development is changing how countries understand and pursue national power. Traditionally, global influence was largely associated with military strength, economic wealth, natural resources and territorial control. Today, access to advanced technology, data, computing capacity and scientific expertise is becoming equally important. Countries that are able to develop and effectively use AI can gain advantages in economic productivity, national security and international influence. In this sense, AI is not simply another technological development; it is increasingly becoming an instrument through which states pursue their interests and compete

for influence in the international system (Nye, 2004; Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (Stanford HAI, 2025).

The geopolitical importance of AI is particularly evident in the growing technological competition between the United States and China. Both countries have invested heavily in AI research, infrastructure, talent and commercial applications, although their areas of strength are not exactly the same. The United States continues to maintain significant advantages in private investment and the development of leading AI models, while China has made considerable progress in AI research, patents and industrial applications. Stanford HAI (2025) reported that U.S.-based institutions produced 40 notable AI models in 2024, compared with 15 from China, while the performance gap between leading American and Chinese models narrowed significantly. This competition is also extending to semiconductors, data centres and advanced computing systems because sophisticated AI models require enormous computing resources. Consequently, the struggle for AI leadership is becoming closely connected to wider questions of economic security, technological sovereignty and strategic influence (Stanford HAI, 2025; OECD, 2025).

The implications of this technological competition are not confined to the major powers. Developing countries face a different challenge because access to the infrastructure, finance, skills and research capacity required for advanced AI remains highly unequal. UNCTAD (2025) reports that the United States and China together account for about one-third of global AI publications and around 60 percent of AI patents, reflecting the concentration of AI capabilities in a relatively small number of countries. For African countries, this situation presents both an opportunity and a concern. AI could support agriculture, healthcare, education, financial services and public administration, but weak digital infrastructure, limited investment in research and development and shortages of specialised skills can make countries heavily dependent on technologies developed elsewhere. The issue, therefore, is not merely whether developing countries will adopt AI, but whether they will have enough capacity to participate in its development and influence the rules governing its use (African Union, 2020; UNCTAD, 2025).

The rise of AI is consequently contributing to a broader change in the nature of global power. Governments are no longer the only important actors, as major technology companies now control significant AI expertise, infrastructure and investment. Stanford HAI (2025) found that industry produced nearly 90 percent of notable AI models in 2024, highlighting the growing influence of private companies in an area with major economic and security consequences. At the same time, governments are increasingly seeking to shape AI standards, regulate its use and reduce dependence on foreign technologies. These developments show that future international influence will depend not only on military or economic strength but also on who controls data, algorithms, computing infrastructure, semiconductor supply chains and technological standards. The geopolitics of AI is therefore becoming an important lens through which to understand the changing distribution of power, the emergence of new forms of dependence and the evolving character of international relations (OECD, 2025; United Nations, 2024; UNCTAD, 2025).

Statement of the Problem

The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is creating new opportunities for economic growth, national security and technological advancement, but it is also creating a new arena of geopolitical competition and inequality. While technologically advanced countries, particularly the United States and China, are investing heavily in AI research, computing infrastructure, semiconductors and skilled personnel, many developing countries continue to face limited access

to the resources needed to develop and control advanced AI technologies. This uneven distribution of AI capabilities raises concerns about new forms of technological dependence and the possibility that existing patterns of global power may be reproduced in the digital age. At the same time, the growing influence of powerful technology companies and the absence of universally accepted rules for AI governance have made it difficult to determine who should control and regulate technologies with significant economic and security implications. Despite the growing importance of AI, there remains insufficient understanding of how its emergence is reshaping traditional sources of global power and influencing relations between technologically advanced and developing countries. This creates the need to examine the geopolitics of AI and its implications for the changing nature and distribution of global power (UNCTAD, 2025; Stanford HAI, 2025; OECD, 2025).

Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this article is to examine how Artificial Intelligence is reshaping global power and international relations. Specifically, the study seeks to:

- i. Examine how AI is influencing competition and the distribution of power among states.
- ii. Assess how access to AI technology, infrastructure and expertise is shaping relations between major powers and developing countries.
- iii. Examine the implications of unequal access to AI and its governance for the position of developing countries in the global system.

Conceptual Review

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence refers broadly to the ability of computer systems to perform tasks that would normally require some form of human intelligence. These tasks include learning from information, recognising patterns, solving problems, understanding language and making decisions. AI is not limited to one particular technology; it covers a wide range of applications, from relatively simple automated systems to sophisticated generative AI capable of producing text, images, audio and computer code. The rapid improvement of AI in recent years has been driven by the availability of large datasets, powerful computing systems, advanced algorithms and substantial investment in research and development (Russell & Norvig, 2021; Stanford HAI, 2025).

What makes AI particularly important today is the speed at which it is moving from experimental technology into everyday economic and political life. Governments use AI for public services and security, businesses apply it to production and decision-making, while researchers use it to accelerate scientific discovery. AI is also becoming increasingly important in military and strategic affairs. Its ability to process large amounts of information quickly makes it useful for intelligence analysis, surveillance, logistics and decision support. This growing range of applications means that AI can no longer be treated simply as a technical issue. It has become closely connected to questions of economic strength, national security and international influence (Horowitz, 2018; OECD, 2025).

Geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence

The geopolitics of AI concerns the way AI is influencing relations among states and the struggle for technological, economic and strategic advantage. It focuses on issues such as access to advanced computing, semiconductor technology, data, skilled personnel, research capacity and AI infrastructure. In simple terms, it asks an important question: who has the capacity to develop and control the technologies that are increasingly shaping the global economy and security environment? This question has become particularly relevant as major powers compete for leadership in AI while governments seek to protect their technological interests and reduce dependence on foreign suppliers (Lee, 2018; UNCTAD, 2025).

The competition surrounding AI also demonstrates that technological power is no longer separate from geopolitical power. A country with advanced AI capabilities can strengthen its economic productivity, improve its military and intelligence systems and exercise greater influence over emerging technological standards. The United States and China provide a clear illustration of this development. Both countries have invested heavily in AI, although they possess different strengths across research, investment, infrastructure and commercial development. Their competition has also extended to advanced semiconductors and computing infrastructure, showing that control over the wider AI ecosystem can be as important as the AI systems themselves (Stanford HAI, 2025; OECD, 2025).

Global Power

Global power traditionally refers to the ability of a state to influence the behaviour and decisions of other actors in the international system. Military strength and economic resources have long been regarded as major sources of such power. However, the nature of power has changed considerably as international relations have become more dependent on information, communication and technology. Nye (2004) argues that power is not simply the ability to command others; it can also involve the ability to attract, persuade and shape the preferences of others. In the present technological environment, these forms of power increasingly intersect with digital capabilities.

AI is adding another layer to this changing understanding of power. States with strong AI industries, research institutions, computing infrastructure and technological companies can acquire advantages that go beyond conventional military or economic strength. AI can improve productivity, support military capabilities, influence information environments and contribute to scientific innovation. The growing importance of these capabilities suggests that technological leadership is becoming an increasingly important component of national power. However, AI does not replace traditional sources of power. Rather, it adds a new dimension to them and can strengthen the existing economic and strategic advantages of states that already possess substantial resources (Nye, 2004; Stanford HAI, 2025).

AI Infrastructure and Technological Power

Behind every advanced AI system is a physical and institutional infrastructure that is often overlooked in discussions about the technology. AI requires powerful processors, data centres, electricity, telecommunications networks, cloud computing services, large datasets and highly trained professionals. Access to these resources is unevenly distributed across the world. This means that countries may have access to AI applications without necessarily possessing the capacity to develop the underlying technologies themselves.

Semiconductors are particularly important in this regard because advanced AI systems require increasingly powerful chips to train and operate. The concentration of semiconductor production and advanced computing capacity in a limited number of countries has therefore become a strategic concern. The OECD (2025) observes that the development of AI infrastructure is characterised by significant concentration and high barriers to entry. This situation gives countries and companies controlling critical infrastructure considerable influence over the development and availability of AI technologies. It also explains why AI competition has increasingly become connected to industrial policy, trade policy and national security.

AI Sovereignty

AI sovereignty refers to the capacity of a country to develop, access and govern AI technologies in a manner that protects its national interests. It does not necessarily mean that every country must produce every component of an AI system domestically. Rather, it involves having enough technological, institutional and human capacity to avoid excessive dependence on external actors in areas that are strategically important. The idea has gained attention as governments have become more conscious of the risks associated with relying heavily on foreign technology companies, data centres, cloud services and semiconductor suppliers.

For developing countries, AI sovereignty presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Building completely independent AI systems may be expensive and unrealistic for many countries, but developing domestic skills, research institutions, data infrastructure and appropriate regulatory frameworks can reduce excessive dependence. UNCTAD (2025) emphasises that developing countries need stronger digital infrastructure, skills and innovation capacity if they are to benefit meaningfully from the expanding AI economy. AI sovereignty, therefore, should be understood not simply as technological independence but as the ability to participate meaningfully in the development, use and governance of AI.

Developing Countries and the AI Divide

The global AI landscape is marked by significant differences between countries. A small group of technologically advanced states and major corporations currently possesses much of the computing power, investment, research capacity and specialised talent required for frontier AI development. Many developing countries, on the other hand, are still dealing with basic challenges such as unreliable electricity, limited broadband access, inadequate research funding and shortages of highly skilled technology professionals. This creates what can be described as an AI divide.

The AI divide is important because unequal access to technology can translate into unequal economic and political opportunities. Countries with stronger AI capabilities may be better positioned to attract investment, develop new industries and improve productivity, while countries with limited capacity may become dependent on imported technologies. UNCTAD (2025) notes that AI development and investment remain highly concentrated, raising concerns that the technology could widen existing inequalities if developing countries are unable to build the necessary capacity. For Africa, the challenge is therefore not simply to adopt technologies developed elsewhere, but to develop the skills, infrastructure and institutions needed to become active participants in the emerging AI economy.

AI Governance and Global Power

AI governance refers to the laws, policies, institutions and international arrangements developed to guide the development and use of AI. It covers issues such as privacy, safety, accountability, human rights, cybersecurity, military applications, data management and competition. The growing importance of AI has made governance particularly difficult because technological development is moving quickly while governments and international institutions often require considerable time to develop appropriate rules.

AI governance is also a question of power because countries with greater technological capabilities are often better positioned to influence international standards and regulations. This raises concerns about the representation of developing countries in global discussions on AI. A governance system shaped mainly by technologically advanced countries and large corporations may not fully reflect the economic and social realities of countries with limited technological capacity. For this reason, effective AI governance requires broader international participation and greater attention to the interests of developing countries (United Nations, 2024; UNCTAD, 2025).

Theoretical Framework: Power Transition Theory

This study is anchored on Power Transition Theory, originally developed by A.F.K. Organski in 1958 and further developed by Organski and Kugler (1980). The theory explains changes in the international system in terms of the rise and decline of major powers. It argues that the international system is not static; rather, differences in economic capacity, population, political organisation and technological development can gradually alter the distribution of power among states. According to the theory, periods of stability may become periods of competition when a rising power approaches the capabilities of an established dominant power. In the context of this study, Artificial Intelligence provides a useful contemporary dimension through which such shifts in power can be examined. AI is increasingly connected to economic productivity, military capability, intelligence, innovation and control over strategic technologies. The growing competition between the United States and China over advanced AI, semiconductors, computing infrastructure and technological standards can therefore be understood as part of a wider struggle over the distribution of capabilities in the international system. The theory helps explain why AI has moved from being primarily a technological concern to an issue of strategic importance, as states increasingly view technological leadership as necessary for maintaining or improving their position in global affairs (Organski, 1958; Organski & Kugler, 1980; Stanford HAI, 2025).

Applied to this study, Power Transition Theory provides a framework for interpreting how AI may contribute to changes in global power and influence. The theory draws attention to the fact that technological capabilities are unevenly distributed and that countries able to accumulate advanced AI infrastructure, skilled human capital, investment and research capacity may strengthen their position in the international system. This is particularly relevant to the study's examination of the relationship between major powers and developing countries. While the United States and China possess substantial resources for AI development, many developing countries remain dependent on foreign technologies, infrastructure and expertise. The study therefore uses the theory to examine whether AI is reinforcing the existing concentration of global power or creating opportunities for new shifts in the international system. It also helps interpret the growing role of private technology companies, semiconductor supply chains and AI infrastructure as components of national and geopolitical power. From this perspective, the geopolitics of AI is understood not simply as a technological race but as part of a broader process through which technological capabilities can strengthen existing powers, enable rising powers to challenge established

advantages, and potentially deepen the gap between technologically advanced and developing states (Nye, 2004; UNCTAD, 2025; OECD, 2025).

Methodology

This study adopted a qualitative research design based on the documentary research method. Data were obtained from secondary sources, including peer-reviewed journal articles, academic books, reports from international organisations, policy documents, institutional publications and credible materials on Artificial Intelligence and global politics. The study focused on materials that addressed AI development, technological competition, global power, AI infrastructure, international security and the position of developing countries in the emerging digital order. The selected materials were examined through thematic analysis, with attention given to recurring issues and patterns relating to the role of AI in global power competition, access to AI technologies and infrastructure, and the implications of unequal AI capabilities for developing countries. The analysis was guided by the objectives of the study and the assumptions of Power Transition Theory, allowing the study to connect developments in AI with broader changes in the distribution of power within the international system. This approach was considered appropriate because the study is concerned with understanding the political and geopolitical meaning of developments in AI rather than measuring them solely through numerical data.

AI and the Emerging Competition for Global Power

The first objective of this study is to examine how Artificial Intelligence is influencing competition and the distribution of power among states. The evidence shows that AI is becoming part of the wider struggle for technological, economic and strategic influence. The United States remains a major force in frontier AI development. In 2024, U.S.-based institutions produced 40 notable AI models, compared with 15 from China and three from Europe. The United States also recorded about \$109.1 billion in private AI investment in the same year, compared with \$9.3 billion in China. At the same time, these figures should not be taken to mean that the technological gap is fixed. Stanford HAI found that Chinese AI models significantly narrowed the performance gap with leading U.S. models during 2024, while China continued to lead in the volume of AI publications and patents. The 2026 AI Index similarly reports that China leads in AI publication volume, citations and patent output, while the United States continues to maintain an advantage in the production of notable AI models. The picture that emerges is therefore one of intense technological competition in which different countries possess different sources of advantage (Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (Stanford HAI, 2025).

This development fits well with Power Transition Theory because the theory is concerned with changes in the relative capabilities of states. AI is giving technological capability a much more direct connection with economic and strategic power. A country that can develop advanced models, attract researchers, provide large-scale computing capacity and turn AI into productive economic activity can improve its overall national capabilities. This explains why AI competition should not be viewed merely as a contest between technology companies. It is increasingly tied to the wider interests of states. The enormous difference in private AI investment is particularly revealing. The United States recorded \$109.1 billion in private AI investment in 2024, nearly twelve times China's \$9.3 billion. Yet China's growing research output and patent position show that financial investment is only one part of technological power. The emerging picture is more complicated, with states building technological strength through different combinations of capital, research, infrastructure, talent and government support (Organski & Kugler, 1980; Stanford HAI, 2025).

AI Infrastructure and the Distribution of Technological Power

The second objective examines how access to AI technology, infrastructure and expertise is shaping relations between major powers and developing countries. The evidence points to a major imbalance. AI may appear to be a digital technology, but its development depends heavily on physical infrastructure, particularly advanced processors, data centres, electricity and telecommunications networks. The OECD identifies advanced chips and computing resources as central components of the AI infrastructure market and notes that these markets are characterised by significant concentration. UNCTAD provides an even clearer picture of the global imbalance, reporting that the United States and China accounted for about one-third of global AI publications and approximately 60 percent of AI patents. UNCTAD also reports that the United States possesses a very large share of the world's supercomputing capacity. These figures demonstrate that AI power is closely connected to control over the infrastructure behind the technology (OECD, 2025; UNCTAD, 2025).

For developing countries, this imbalance has practical consequences. A country may be able to use AI-powered agricultural tools, medical applications, automated administrative systems or generative AI without possessing the infrastructure or expertise required to develop such technologies itself. There is nothing inherently wrong with adopting foreign technology, but extensive dependence can become a problem when strategically important technologies are controlled elsewhere. The situation becomes more serious when countries lack the computing capacity, skilled personnel and research institutions needed to adapt AI to their own circumstances. UNCTAD reports that most developing countries, apart from a few leading countries such as China and India, have made limited progress in AI knowledge creation. This suggests that the emerging AI economy could reproduce some of the inequalities already present in the international economic system if developing countries do not build their own technological capacity (UNCTAD, 2025).

The African situation deserves particular attention. Africa is not without potential in the AI era. The continent has a large young population, expanding digital markets and increasing interest in technology-driven development. The African Union's Digital Transformation Strategy recognises digitalisation as an important driver of economic growth, job creation, improved service delivery and sustainable development. However, turning this potential into actual technological power requires sustained investment in infrastructure, education, research and innovation. African countries therefore cannot afford to approach AI simply as consumers waiting for technologies developed in Silicon Valley, Beijing or elsewhere. There is a need to build the capacity to develop, adapt and govern AI according to African development priorities. Without such capacity, technological dependence could become another form of external dependence within the international system (African Union, 2020; UNCTAD, 2025).

Unequal AI Capabilities and Global Governance

The third objective examines the implications of unequal access to AI and its governance for developing countries in the global system. The evidence suggests that the inequality is not only about who has access to AI applications; it is also about who has the ability to shape the rules under which AI is developed and used. AI governance now covers issues ranging from data protection

and transparency to cybersecurity, military applications, competition and responsible use. Stanford HAI reported that international cooperation on AI governance increased during 2024, with institutions such as the United Nations, OECD, European Union and African Union developing frameworks around responsible and trustworthy AI. However, participation in international discussions does not necessarily translate into equal influence. Countries with greater technological resources, research capacity and financial strength are generally better positioned to influence technical standards and international negotiations (Stanford HAI, 2025).

The growing influence of private technology companies adds another dimension to this problem. Traditional international relations tend to place states at the centre of global power, but AI has made that picture more complicated. Stanford HAI found that nearly 90 percent of notable AI models in 2024 were produced by industry, compared with about 60 percent in 2023. This means that some of the world's most important AI capabilities are being developed by corporations rather than governments directly. These companies possess capital, technical expertise, computing resources and infrastructure with implications for national economic and security interests. Governments therefore increasingly have to cooperate with, regulate and sometimes depend on private technology firms. This represents an important change in the structure of global power because technological influence is no longer located entirely within the state (Stanford HAI, 2025).

Technological power is also becoming increasingly connected to energy and physical resources. As AI models become larger and more computationally demanding, the infrastructure required to train and operate them becomes more significant. Stanford HAI reports that the computing power used to train notable AI models has been increasing rapidly, alongside the energy required for their development. This means that the AI race is not happening in cyberspace alone. It has implications for electricity generation, data-centre construction, semiconductor manufacturing and infrastructure investment. Countries with reliable energy systems, large-scale computing facilities and access to advanced chips are consequently better positioned to develop AI at scale (Stanford HAI, 2025).

Taken together, the findings from the three objectives show that AI is becoming an important component of contemporary global power. First, the competition between major powers demonstrates that AI capability is increasingly connected to national strength and strategic influence. Second, the concentration of computing infrastructure, patents, investment and expertise shows that the benefits of AI are unevenly distributed. Third, the growing role of private companies and the emerging system of AI governance demonstrate that the struggle is not only over developing the technology but also over who controls it and who participates in setting the rules. From the perspective of Power Transition Theory, these developments suggest that technological capability can contribute to changes in the relative position of states. AI does not, however, replace traditional sources of power. Rather, it interacts with economic resources, state capacity, infrastructure and human capital. The geopolitics of AI is therefore part of a wider transformation in which technological capability is becoming increasingly important to how power is accumulated, exercised and distributed across the international system (Organski & Kugler, 1980; OECD, 2025; UNCTAD, 2025).

Summary of Major Findings

The study examined the geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the changing nature of global power, with particular attention to the competition among states, unequal access to AI capabilities,

and the implications for developing countries. The major findings are presented in line with the three objectives of the study.

First, the study found that AI is becoming an important source of national power and a growing area of competition among major states. The United States and China have emerged as the leading centres of AI development, although they possess different areas of strength. The United States maintains significant advantages in private investment, frontier AI models, computing capacity and leading technology companies, while China has made substantial progress in AI research, publications, patents and model performance. The competition therefore extends beyond the development of AI applications to include semiconductors, data centres, research talent, investment and computing infrastructure. In line with Power Transition Theory, these developments show that technological capabilities can influence the relative power of states and contribute to changes in the distribution of power within the international system (Organski & Kugler, 1980; Stanford HAI, 2025, 2026).

Second, the study found that access to AI technology, infrastructure and expertise is highly uneven and is shaping relationships between major powers and developing countries. Advanced processors, data centres, reliable electricity, telecommunications networks, research institutions, skilled personnel and financial investment are concentrated largely in a relatively small number of countries. The United States and China account for a substantial share of global AI research and patents, while many developing countries remain dependent on technologies, infrastructure and expertise developed elsewhere. Although countries can benefit from adopting foreign AI technologies, limited domestic capacity can create technological dependence and restrict their ability to adapt AI to their own economic and developmental needs. The findings further show that Africa possesses considerable potential but requires stronger investment in digital infrastructure, research, education, skills and innovation to participate meaningfully in the AI economy (African Union, 2020; UNCTAD, 2025).

Third, the study found that unequal access to AI is also reflected in global AI governance and has important implications for the position of developing countries. Countries and corporations with greater technological, financial and research capabilities have stronger opportunities to influence the standards, regulations and international arrangements governing AI. The increasing dominance of private technology companies in the production of advanced AI models has also complicated the traditional state-centred understanding of global power. Consequently, developing countries face a dual challenge: gaining access to AI technologies while also securing meaningful participation in decisions about how those technologies are governed. Without stronger domestic technological capacity and greater participation in international AI governance, existing inequalities in the global system may be reproduced through the emerging AI economy (Stanford HAI, 2025; United Nations, 2024; UNCTAD, 2025).

Conclusion

The study concludes that the geopolitics of Artificial Intelligence is becoming an important dimension of contemporary global power, as advances in AI are reshaping competition among states, relations between major powers and developing countries, and participation in global governance. The findings show that countries with strong AI research, computing infrastructure, investment, skilled personnel and technological industries are gaining additional sources of

economic and strategic influence, while countries with limited capabilities risk deeper technological dependence. Although the United States and China currently occupy central positions in the global AI landscape, the changing distribution of AI capabilities suggests that technological development will increasingly influence the relative position of states. For developing countries, particularly in Africa, the challenge is to move beyond being consumers of externally developed technologies by strengthening domestic infrastructure, human capital, research capacity and participation in AI governance. AI is therefore not simply a technological development; it is becoming part of the broader struggle over economic opportunities, strategic influence and the distribution of power in the international system.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are significant:

1. Strengthen national AI research and innovation capacity through sustained investment in research institutions, AI laboratories, computing facilities, semiconductor-related capabilities and partnerships between government, universities and the private sector. This will enable countries to develop AI capabilities that contribute to their economic and strategic interests.
2. Expand AI infrastructure and human capital development, particularly in developing countries, by improving access to reliable electricity, high-speed internet, data centres, computing resources and specialised AI training. Greater investment in technical education and research skills will reduce dependence on foreign expertise and technologies.
3. Promote stronger participation of developing countries in global AI governance by supporting regional and international cooperation on AI standards, data governance, cybersecurity, ethical use and technology transfer. African countries should coordinate their positions and strengthen domestic regulatory institutions so that they can participate more effectively in shaping the rules governing the emerging global AI order.

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